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Abstract
This paper compares linear programming and stable marriage approaches to the
assignment problem under conditions of uncertainty. Robust solutions should exhibit
reduced variability in the presence of one or more additional constraints.
Several variations of each approach are compared with respect to solution qual-
ity, as measured by the overall social welfare among Officers and Assignments, and
robustness as measured by the number of changes after a number of randomized
perturbations. We examine the contrasts between these methods in the context of
assigning Army Officers among a set of identified assignments. Additional constraints
are modeled after realistic scenarios faced by Army assignment managers, with pa-
rameters randomized.
The Pareto efficient approaches, relative to these measures of quality and robust-
ness, are identified and subjected to a regression analysis. The coefficients of these
models provide insight into the impact the different scenarios under study, as well as
inform any trade-off decisions between Pareto-optimal approaches.
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A SCENARIO-BASED PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS OF STABLE MARRIAGE
APPROACHES TO THE ARMY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM
I. Introduction
Every day, HRC executes distribution, strategic talent management, per-
sonnel programs and services Army wide in order to optimize Total Force
personnel readiness and strengthen an agile and adaptive Army.
–Mission of the United States Army Human Resources Command [1]
1.1 Background
One of the missions of the United States Army’s Human Resources Command
(HRC) is to annually manage the assignment and distribution of 92,627 active duty
Officers and 378,193 active duty Enlisted personnel to Army and Joint organization
around the world. While most personnel are assigned to a large unit or geographic
location for a period between three to four years, military necessity requires the
periodic balancing of national security and professional development requirements
with the personal desires of Soldiers and their Families. [2]
Army Officer assignments may be difficult to address, given the many concerns
surrounding assignments, both from the perspective of the Army and from Officers.
While current practice involves Officers submitting personal preferences, ordinal list-
ings communicating their most desirable assignments, assignment managers at HRC
manually develop assignment slates or matchings of Officers to assignments.
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The Army invests heavily in the training, education and experiences of its leaders,
but many are under no obligation to stay, except for the desire to serve or financial
incentive of cliff retirement. Desirable assignments can prove vital to career progres-
sion, family well-being, and job satisfaction. A transparent and fair allocation of jobs
supports the Army mission.
Before work on an assignment slate can start, HRC must first identify Officers who
will require a new assignment, either to support the Army Manning Guidance or due
to the professional development requirements described in Army Regulation 600-3,
The Army Personnel Development System. Assignment Managers Officers to develop
a supply of Officers available for moves during the planned period or assignment cy-
cle. Units currently under-filled due to attrition (retirements, separations, etc.) or
projected moves of Officers then submit requisitions for replacement Officers. These
requisitions are collated and prioritized based upon the strategy developed by the
Army Manning Guidance. Validated requisitions serve as a starting point for assign-
ment managers to develop their assignment slate; in general these are the assignments
that they must fill.
Currently, assignment managers have few tools with which they can develop qual-
ity assignment slates. Instead, they toil over spreadsheets, manually weighing Officer
preferences with Army requirements. Changes occurring late in the assignment pro-
cess, such as a directed assignment, the rejection of an Officer from a Joint assignment,
or the diagnosis of a serious illness or injury can require the assignment manager to
either rework large portions of a slate, change assignment orders already issued, or
accept a solution of lower quality than could otherwise be achieved. This research
seeks to provide an algorithmic process for assignment managers to develop quality
assignment slates that are robust to the vagaries of life in the presence of uncertainty.
2
1.2 Problem Statement
We have a sacred trust to take care of Soldiers in every component. To-
gether we will make the Army stronger.
–MG Thomas C. Seamands, 5 June 2015
Commander, United States Army Human Resources Command [3]
The Army Officer assignment process is critical to the success of the Army. The
ideal assignment process balances the needs of the Army with the career goals and
preferences of the Officer. The size of the problem for a typical assignment manager
can easily preclude manual assignment processes. Automated processes generally
involves some mathematical representation of the problem which is usually solved
using a linear programming formulation.
Mathematical programs yield assignment strategies optimal with respect to some
solution characteristics defined in an objective function. Unfortunately initial so-
lutions may not be final solutions, as changes to assignment demands and the life
situations of Officers potentially change the suggested solution.
Linear programming algorithms are chaotic; small changes to inputs, such as an
assignment no longer available, the addition of new assignments, or the restriction
or directed assignment of an Officer to a subset of assignments, may cause dramatic
changes in the output [4]. Implementation of the new assignment strategy indicated
may necessitate massive changes to assignment orders. A practical assignment process
cannot tolerate dramatic changes and the resultant turmoil to Soldiers and their
Families.
This work examines alternative approaches for the Army Officer assignment prob-
lem. The Gale-Shapley algorithm is examined with respect to its applicability to
the assignment problem, the quality of solutions compared to linear programming,
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and the robustness of the assignment methodology with respect to changes to the
inclusion of additional assignment constraints.
1.3 Approach
First, we develop comparable formulations for an appropriate instance of the As-
signment Problem, with parameters drawn from a representative case provided by the
United States Army Human Resources Command (HRC). Linear Programming (LP)
and Stable Marriage approaches are used to develop initial solutions to a boolean
programming assignment model. This model should seek to minimize the total pref-
erences, or maximize the social welfare, of both Officers and Assignments. The Gale-
Shapley Stable Marriage algorithm provides a stable solution. These initial solutions
are stored, and the underlying model randomly perturbed through the addition of one
or more new constraints, grounded in realistic scenarios faced by Assignment Man-
agers at HRC. New optimal solutions are found based using warm and cold start L as
well as several Stable Marriage variants. The results from each result are compared
with respect to overall solution quality as well as the number of changed decision
variables from the initial to final solution. Various implementations of the Stable
Marriage Algorithm are examined with respect to both solution quality and the num-
ber of changes, or robustness of the approach. New insight is gleaned into when each
approach might be preferred.
1.4 Assumptions
All models are wrong but some are useful.
–George E. P. Box [5]
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Individual preferences provided for each Officer represent their ordinal rankings of
assignments to which they might feasibly be assigned. These preference lists should
be feasibly complete, in that for each officer the rankings are complete over the subset
of all assignments for which they are eligible. The errors present in the model data
provided, are assumed to be transcription errors as discussed in Appendix A.
While the use of ordinal numbers as cost coefficients implicitly infers a linear
preference relationship where another monotonic function might be more appropriate,
the benefit of more accurate value functions might not be commensurate with the costs
of eliciting those preferences. Preferences might be revealed using decision analysis
techniques, such as allocating a fixed budget of preference-weighting points across a
set of assignments, such as those show in Figure 1. These hypothetical preference
function show some alternative distributions of 120 “points,” shown on the y-axis,
over 15 possible assignments, on the x-axis, while retaining the same preference order.
However, given the observed errors in a relatively simple ordinal ranking system, as
documented in Appendix A, the expenditure of resources to ensure proper execution
of more complex elicitation techniques will likely be high. Given that the Gale-
Shapely algorithm provides results with ordinal inputs, we assume that such inputs
are sufficient to represent the preference values of our officer population. Further
analysis may illuminate the degree to which greater fidelity can improve an LP-derived
optimal solution, as well as examine the costs associated with such improvements.
1.5 Summary
This research provides HRC Assignment Managers algorithmic processes by which
high quality assignment slates could be rapidly generated while providing robust
Officer-to-assignment slates that do not incur many changes when reacting to last
minute perturbations (e.g. an assignment being canceled, an officer becoming un-
5
Figure 1. Theoretical Preference Functions of Officers over Potential Assignments
available for assignment). It may find further application to other matching prob-
lems in which there is a high cost or a long lead-time to implement changes to an
incumbent solution. With higher penalties to changes in individual assignments, sta-
bility may be a desired characteristic in solutions that may not be incorporated via
a single-dimensional fitness function. Such applications may include facility place-
ment problems, the assignment of contracts, and the commitment of forces in combat
models.
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II. Literature Review
We [previously managed] people in the Army basically by two variables:
what is your rank and what is your occupational specialty... Now we have
a million folks that we can tap into and get them on the field in the right
position, in the right place at the right time.
–LTG James McConville, 5 October, 2016
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Headquarters, United States Army [6]
2.1 Overview
This chapter reviews previously published literature on solution methodologies to
the bipartite assignment problem. Solution approaches to the bipartite assignment
problem can be roughly divided between those with a focus purely upon optimization
and those approaches that utilize some form of the Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage
Algorithm. We then explore previous applications of the Stable Marriage Algorithm,
both in general as well as to specific military applications.
Of note, male and female pronouns noting the perspective of some arbitrary Army
Officer are used throughout the discussion herein with neither preference nor prejudice
towards any gender. Within this work and in context of the stable marriage algo-
rithm, the terms male and female represent arbitrary labels established in applicable
scientific literature for the two sets of a bipartite matching problem.
2.2 Bipartite Assignment Problem
Matching problems arise frequently. Ahuja [7] describes the classical bipartite
matching problem as a special instance of the assignment problem wherein the ob-
jects are partitioned into two mutual exclusive groups. The two sets of interest are
7
sometimes called men and women, noted here as sets M and W respectively, each
with complete preferences over the members of the other set such that the value or
cost of any pairing can be evaluated. Bazaraa, Jarvis and Sherali develop a math-
ematical form of the assignment problem, expressed in terms of assigning m males
(officers) to m females (assignments), shown in Equation (1) [8].
minimize
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
cijxij
subject to
m∑
j=1
xij = 1, i = 1, ...,m
m∑
i=1
−xij = −1, j = 1, ...,m
xij ∈ {0, 1}, i, j = 1, ...,m
(1)
Here cij is the cost or preference value associated with the marriage or pairing of
man i to woman j and xij is a binary decision variable associated with the inclusion
(i.e., xij = 1) or exclusion (i.e., xij = 0) of that marriage from a matching. Unequal
cardinalities of sets M and W are typically handled by the inclusion of placeholder
indices or dummy variables that represent a null partner with an appropriate null
valued assignment contribution to the objective.
The minimization formulation would be appropriate for cij given in terms of costs.
If benefits are instead used, a maximization formulation is more appropriate. How-
ever, it should be noted that these preference values are for each unique pair, and so
they reflect some combination of male and female preferences. In other words, a man
and a woman are allowed to have different preference values for each other; cij-values
should reflect both preferences in that pair’s contribution to the objective function.
A member of the solution is a pair formed from a single object from each group.
Therefore, any solution S is a collection of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaus-
tive pairs (m,w) ∈ S such that m ∈M,w ∈ W . A complete solution to the bipartite
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matching problem is called a matching, which forms a bijection between the two sets
M and W , herein labeled arbitrarily as men and women, respectively [7].
If the structure given in Equation (1) remains, we can simplify the expressions in
vector-matrix form to that in Equation (2).
minimize f(x)
subject to Ax = b where b =
 1
-1

x ≥ 0
(2)
While the quality of a matching can be defined classically via a fitness function,
such as the coefficients given in Equation (1), a more general scoring of a solution can
be provided by some f(x). The function f scores any solution, represented here by
the vector of binary decision variables x. Generally, f is assumed to be linear, which
inherently assumes independent contributions of different matchings to the objective
function.
Another approach to evaluating the relative quality of matchings is to use a list
of ordinal preferences. Although Dean and Swar’s work [9] does include the use
ordinal preferences in allocation problems, not much other work found in the literature
systematically addresses the comparative utility of ordinal value preference data to
actual objective cost, preference, or value functions that are defined to have interval
or ratio measures. Dean and Swar [9] introduced the generalized stable allocation
problem, or GSAP, dealing with ordinal preferences, but they did not juxtapose the
relative quality of solutions obtained through their proposed method to comparative
instances of a generalized assignment problem with either ordinal cost components or
representative costs. It appears to be an open question in the literature to establish,
either empirically or theoretically, the marginal value of ratio preference values over
9
ordinal preference values.
Some literature ascribes value to other measures of matchings rather than just
fitness derived from costs or preferences. Kimbrough and Kuo [10], in developing
multiobjective fitness functions for matching heuristics, describe measures of equity
and social welfare. These measures assign additional value to matchings that are
somehow more “fair” to members of each gender. They define equity as the sum of
absolute differences between the preferences of each match, and social welfare as the
sum of ordinal preferences of each match [10].
To illustrate the difference between social welfare and equity, suppose there are
two men, {m1,m2} and two women, {w1, w2} with both men and women uniformly
preferring 1 to 2. We can see in Table 1 that while these two simple matchings have
similar social welfare scores, their levels of equity differ. While the nomenclature
connotes some meaning, care should be exercised to determine the applicability of
these measures and their correct physical interpretation given some problem instance
and application.
More commonly examined than social welfare and equity is the notion of stability.
A matching S is deemed unstable if and only if ∃(m,w) /∈ S such that both m and
w prefer each other to their respective partners within S [11]. Such a pair (m,w) is
called a blocking pair [9]. A stable solution admits no blocking pairs. Although the
literature on exact thresholds to define “nearly stable” solutions [12] is sparse, the
stability of S is measured by the total number of blocking pairs it contains [10]. For
any set of ordinal male and female preferences, there exists a stable matching that
Table 1. Comparison of Social Welfare, Equity and Stability
Social Welfare Equity Stability
{(m1, w1), (m2, w2)} 2 + 4 = 6 0 + 0 = 0 0
{(m1, w2), (m2, w1)} 3 + 3 = 6 1 + 1 = 2 1
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can be found in quadratic time [7]. In Table 1, we can see that, whereas the first
match is stable, the second match is not.
2.3 Linear Programming Based Solutions to the Assignment Problem
The minimum weighted matching problem on a bipartite graph has some special
properties that can be leveraged. Assignment problems, as special cases of Trans-
portation problems, can yield bases that are unimodular [8]. In the matrix formulation
of the assignment problem given in Equation (2), the matrix A may be totally uni-
modular, in that every square non-singular submatrix is unimodular. When A is to-
tally unimodular and the right-hand-side is integer-valued, any basis will yield integer-
valued decision variables. In other words, all extrema of the region {x|Ax = b} have
integer valued coordinates. Integrality constraints can then be relaxed when applying
LP solution methods and an LP-based method will attain the optimal solution to the
binary integer program, as long as any additional constraints retain this property of
A.
Unfortunately, the addition of other side constraints may lead to a matrix A that
is not totally unimodular. In this case polynomial time algorithms may fail to provide
integer-valued solutions to the LP relaxation. For instance, without transformation
into an equivalent form, the Hungarian Algorithm cannot be applied and other poly-
nomial time algorithms (e.g. Karmarkar’s projective algorithm or the Affine Scaling
algorithm) cannot solve the linear programming relaxation with a guarantee that
the resultant optimal solution will be integral [8]. Other iterative methods of solving
integer and boolean mathematical programs exist using cutting planes or branch-and-
bound methods, and heuristic search methods forego a proof of optimality altogether.
These methods can be used in concert and are typically integrated in commercial
optimization software such as Gurobi [13] when solving combinatorial optimization
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problems.
2.4 Stable Marriage Algorithm
The stable marriage algorithm, also called either the Gale-Shapley (GS) or De-
ferred Acceptance algorithm, is a heuristic that attempts to find a stable solution to
the bipartite assignment problem, and is well studied in literature [14]. While it seeks
to find a high quality solution, Gale and Shapley originally proposed it to address the
college admissions process, a matching market with incomplete information, in order
to reduce uncertainty for both colleges and applicants. In building the algorithm,
Gale and Shapley reduced the problem to examining potential marriages between an
equal number of men and women, each with ordinal or ranked preferences [15]. The
bipartite assignment problem described in Section 2.2 is therefore often referred to as
the stable marriage problem.
Within the context of the stable marriage approach to the assignment problem,
the two sets of interest are commonly called men and women, noted here as M and W
respectively, each with complete preferences over the members of the other set. As an
assignment problem, a solution S is a collection of mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive pairs (m,w) such that m ∈ M,w ∈ W . The goal of the Stable Marriage
Algorithm, described in Algorithm 1, is to find a stable solution [15].
The Stable Marriage Algorithm requires as input two matrices each representing
the ordinal ranking of members of one set on the other, i.e. men on women and vice
versa [7]. These are represented in Algorithm 1 as prefm and prefw respectively.
Alternatively, these may be viewed as a single matrix of ordered pairs [15], or as a
set of preference vectors for each element [7], without loss of generality in either case.
However stored, the preference information is used at each step in the algorithm.
At the first step of each iteration, the manner in which we select m from the set
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Algorithm 1 Pseudocode for the Gale-Shapely Stable Marriage Algorithm
M is the set of Men, W the set of Women
for m ∈M,w ∈ W :
prefm, prefw are preference lists for each men, women
S = ∅; the pairs (m,w) in the current matching
procedure Stable Marriage(prefm, prefw)
while ∃m ∈Ms.t.(m,w) /∈ S for some w ∈ W do
m← select m s.t. m /∈ p, ∀p ∈ S
w ← pop(prefm)
p← p ∈ S where w ∈ p
if w /∈ p for some pair p ∈ S then
S ← (m,w)
else if w prefers m to current match then
remove pair p from S
S ← (m,w)
else
do nothing
of currently unmatched men may alter the final solution obtained, and we will later
categorize the variants of Stable Marriage in part by whether we use a single arbitrary-
but-consistent lexicographic order or we sample from the available men randomly. In
any case, the GS algorithm will always return a stable solution [7].
McVitie and Wilson [16] developed a recursive algorithm that provides identical
results to the GS algorithm, but the authors note that the larger consumption of
memory would likely only result in moderate improvements in the algorithm’s per-
formance with respect to required computational effort. For test problems of size
m = 50, they demonstrated a 30% improvement of the recursive algorithm over the
GS algorithm [16]. However, these results with ALGOL, a functional programming
language very supportive of recursion, are likely not achievable with Microsoft’s Vi-
sual Basic for Applications (VBA), which trades-off features favorable for recursion
for those more favorable to iterative methods [17].
McVitie and Wilson [16] also modify the recursive algorithm in order to enumerate
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all stable solutions rather than just the single solution optimal to the proposing
set (i.e., male optimal). An interesting note is that with the female optimal stable
solution known, we can restrict our search since men can never be worse off than they
are in the female optimal solution without constructing a blocking pair [16]. However,
the female optimal can be found directly by interchanging the roles of the proposals.
Therefore, an implementation of this could be made to find first both the male and
female solutions before iteratively generating additional stable solutions.
When preferences contain some level of indifference, that is when one person has
the same utility for a match with multiple partners, the algorithm can accommodate
with an extended definition of blocking pair. Manlove [18] explored two variants of
the Stable Marriage problem with ties (SMT). A weakly stable matching occurs when
there are no blocking pairs that are strictly preferred, while a strongly stable matching
admits no weakly preferred blocking pairs.
2.5 Previous Applications of the Stable Marriage Algorithm
Perhaps the best known application of the Stable Marriage Algorithm is its use
by the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP). The NRMP implements the
algorithm to provide stable matchings of medical residents to hospital residency pro-
grams and assurances to each program that their slots would be filled, without re-
quiring medical students to respond in an unreasonably short time [19]. The success
of this particular application was a driving force behind the awarding of the 2012
Nobel Prize in Economics to Roth and Shapely [20]. Similar uses of deferred ac-
ceptance algorithms are noted for several centralized labor markets in the medical
community [21].
Given the original language of the Stable Marriage Algorithm in terms of college
applications [15], it is unsurprising that its use in education has spread. Leveraging
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the literature on matching markets, the Ministry of Education for Singapore utilizes
the Stable Marriage Algorithm to match students to secondary schools using only
student preferences and scores on the Primary School Leaving Examination [11]. The
distribution of students among New York City high schools turned from lottery to a
deferred acceptance algorithm in 2003 [22]. In 2005, Boston public schools adopted a
deferred acceptance algorithm to assign students based upon parent preferences while
balancing individual school requirements [23].
Applications of the Stable Marriage algorithm may also be found in modern in-
formation technology. A generalized version of the GS algorithm provides a rapid
method to establish a matching between users and servers for content delivery net-
works, such as Akamai or Netflix. In content delivery networks, there is very rapid
change of preference orderings and constraints due to time-varying network conges-
tion as well as topological network changes over time. The algorithm provides a
matching, stable over a short time horizon, of geographic clusters of users to network
nodes that function as content servers [24].
The Stable Marriage Algorithm has begun to receive attention for its potential
military applications as well. Hill et al. [4] applied the Stable Marriage Algorithm to
the nuclear posture review, assigning a notional non-homogeneous supply of nuclear
weapons to a list of targets. They observed chaotic behavior of LP-based solutions
in dynamic-systems not seen in stable solutions, noting that changes may not be de-
sirable when “adopting a plan already under execution” [4]. More recently, Naeem
and Masood [25] of the Pakistani Military College of Signals explored the use of the
Stable Marriage Algorithm to model detected threats and assign to them a probable
target among some set of defended assets. This model enabled a larger threat evalu-
ation and weapon assignment process by quickly providing a robust estimate of likely
threat behavior [25].
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In a human resources context, there have been cases of LP-based approaches in the
services. In the United States Air Force, Wylie sought to optimize the assignment
of so-called rated officers, those with aeronautical credentials. Wylie [26] utilized
an assignment formulation that could be solved as a network flow with the rou-
tines available in SAS. Recently, Lepird [27] proposed further research into adapting
algorithmic approaches to Air Force personnel assignments, using either an LP for-
mulation or the Stable Marriage Algorithm. Within the United States Army, Sonmez
and Switzer [28] used an agent-based model with an Officer-optimal stable solution,
where side contracts could be chosen to receive a first choice. While the research
primarily investigated the matching with contracts paradigm, the underlying model
for their agents utilized a deferred acceptance algorithm.
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III. Methodology
Although the Army’s industrial-aged personnel management system is ad-
equate today, it will not support the Army’s needs in 2025 and beyond.
[We] recognize this and are calling for a human capital management trans-
formation that will enable our effort to meet future strategic challenges
more effectively.
–Lieutenant General Robert B. Brown
Commander, United States Army Combined Arms Center
Talent Management Concept of Operations
for Force 2025 and Beyond [29]
3.1 Introduction
Our methodology consists of comparing various implementations of LP and the GS
algorithm both before and after an incumbent solution of each method is subjected
to additional constraints and the same approach reapplied.
3.2 Provenance of the Exemplar Model Data
Given the common practice among Army assignment managers and the logisti-
cal burdens in eliciting more precise value functions from a large pool of personnel,
the base models we build utilize readily available ordinal preferences for each Of-
ficer. We sourced both the preference data and officer data for these base models
from anonymized exemplar data provided by HRC. Development of realistic assign-
ment scenarios led to the additional constraints under review. While selection of
the scenario was experimentally controlled, the selection of the affected Officers and
assignments were randomized.
The data received from HRC required cleaning before use, yielding preferences for
161 Officers over 139 assignments. Some preferences were incomplete, or contained
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errors in rankings. The steps taken to clean the data are listed in detail in Appendix
A. Immediately, one Officer and assignment pair could be removed due to a unique
training pipeline resulting in a single feasible assignment connecting an Officer’s prior
selection to enter that program. Dividing the available assignments into those consid-
ered “key and developmental” (KD), and dividing the Officers into those who require
a KD assignment and those who do not, shows that since there are 86 non-KD Officers
but only 71 KD assignments, we expected that every KD assignment should go to an
Officer requiring a KD assignment.
3.3 Model Formulation
Sets.
Let the set of all Officers eligible for reassignment be O , {0, 1, 2, . . . , 159}.
We partition O by whether the Officer has previously held a KD assignment for their
current grade so that OKD is the set of Officers lacking experience in a KD assignment,
and OB is the set of Officers who have already completed a KD assignment. By
inspection we see that OKD ⊆ O, OB ⊆ O and that OKD∪OB = O while OKD∩OB =
∅, thereby establishing a partition of O.
OB is the set of KD-Complete Officers , {0, 1, . . . , 71}.
OKD is the set of Officers requiring KD assignment , {72, 73, . . . , 159}.
Similarly, we construct and partition the set of available assignments, Aavailable ,
Table 2. Exemplar Data Provided by Sponsor
Type Officers Assignments
KD 86 71
Broadening 74 67
Special Training Program 1 1
Total 161 139
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{0, 1, . . . , 138} into the first 72 KD assignments and the remaining 67 broadening
(B) assignments, Aavailable = AKD ∪ AB respectively. In the current case, AKD =
{1, . . . , 72}, and AB = {73, . . . , 138} and AKD,∩AB = ∅.
We also note two basic observations regarding the respective cardinality of each
set, for this problem instance.
|O| > |Aavailable|. (3)
There are more Officers than available assignments.
|OKD| > |AKD|. (4)
There are more Officers requiring a KD assignment than there are KD assignments.
In response to the first observation, we augment the set of available assignments
with a set of “dummy” or null assignments, AD. With A = Aavailable ∪ AD = AKD ∪
AB ∪ AD such that |A| = |O|, we would interpret the assignment of an Officer to a
element of AD as the Officer not receiving any new orders and instead being deferred
to a future assignment problem.
Officer preferences are recorded as 2-dimensional list, or alternatively a matrix, as
shown in Equation (5). P is a matrix where pij is the preference value of the Officer
i for assignment j.
pij ,

Preference over set AKD, j ∈ AKD
Preference over set AB, j ∈ AB
0, otherwise.
(5)
There are two significant notes, however.
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1. Due to problem structure and how preference information is collected, these
preferences are split independently between preferences over AKD and AB.
2. In order to model indifference in LP, an average value is used. This is the
average of the values that might have been given if a strict preference would
have been required.
To illustrate the second point, we can examine the hypothetical preferences of two
Officers over a group of assignments, identical except for a single ambivalence between
two assignments. As shown in Table 3, we can see that Officer “B” is indifferent
between his top two choices of assignment (Assignments 1 and 2).
Table 3. Problematic Indifference
Officer Assignment 1 Assignment 2 . . . Assignment n
A 1 2 . . . n
B 1 (Indifferent) . . . n− 1
...
...
...
. . .
Table 4 shows the pathological example of this behavior for a large number n
assignments, with Officer B indifferent between all of the first n− 1 assignments. A
solution assigning the nth assignment to Officer “B” is a 2nd choice, while it would be
the nth for Officer “A”. With a difference of n− 2, we begin to see that the “rank” of
the least preferred assignment might be reduced by the total quantity of indifference
expressed by the Officer.
Table 4. Indifference - Pathological Example
Officer Assignment 1 . . . Assignment n− 1 Assignment n
A 1 . . . n− 1 n
B 1 (Indifferent) 2
The cumulative effect of ties within a long list, if left unchecked, may leave Officers
expressing preferences with ties at a disadvantage relative to their peers. While there
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are several ways to handle ties, such as taking the maximum or minimum value of
the tied values, as demonstrated in Table 5 we chose the average method without
prejudice towards the others, in order to construct weakly stable matchings. In our
context of assigning Officers to Assignments, the requirements of a strongly stable
match are unnecessary, and the hypothetical issues raised by Manlove [18] do not
apply.
Table 5. Indifference Expressed using the Average Method
Officer Assignment 1 Assignment 2 . . . Assignment 3
A 1 2 . . . n
B 1.5 (Indifferent) . . . n
We define yi as the year-group of Officer i. This is the cohort year that effectively
marks the year of their entry into commissioned service, adjusted for prior experience
or for unusual career advancement (e.g., promoted ahead or behind peers during
previous promotion boards). Many Officer personnel management decisions in the
Army, particularly consideration for promotions, are based upon an Officer’s year-
group. The parameter di is a relative measure of an Officer’s year-group, such that
di = yi −miny (6)
and
dmax = max
i
{di|i ∈ O}. (7)
We use the relative differences to determine for each assignment its preference
over the set of Officers. We define cij as the coefficient expressing the preference of
assignment j for Officer i.
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cij ,

s(dmax − di)
10
, j ∈ AD,
sdi, i ∈ OKD and j ∈ AKD,
s(dmax − di), i ∈ OB and j ∈ AB,
0, i ∈ OB and j ∈ AB,
(8)
where s is a scaling constant equal to the size of the set O, or s = |O|. The scalar s is
chosen so that the small maximum preference range of assignments is not dominated
by the larger number of preferences expressed by Officers.
Decision Variables.
We define the decision to assign an Officer i ∈ O to an assignment j ∈ A as:
xij ,

1, if Officer i is matched with assignment j,
0, otherwise.
(9)
We refer to the entire two-dimensional list, or matrix of decisions, as the matching
given by X. Since both matrices and sets of possible solutions are traditionally
represented by capital letters, for clarity we denote the larger set of all possible
matchings from which X is drawn as the universal set U such that X ∈ U .
Objectives.
We define several objectives for a matching of Officers to assignments. These
functions map any match X to a real-valued measure. The first function measures
match quality with respect to the utilization of KD assignments, the second function
measures quality with respect to Officer preferences, and the third function measures
the stability of a match by giving the number of blocking pairs. The fourth function
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measures quality with respect to assignment preferences.
Objective 1: Maximize KD Opportunity.
f1(X) =
∑
i∈OKD
∑
j∈AKD
yixij. (10)
To optimize the available promotion opportunity of Officers, we prioritize the uti-
lization of open key and developmental assignments to their fullest. A desired match-
ing will assign non-KD complete Officers to KD assignments, further prioritizing those
in the oldest year groups who are in closer proximity to their next promotion oppor-
tunity (i.e. those with the greatest need). Transformed for a minimization, Equation
(10) uses the summed year-group values of all Officers requiring KD assignment that
are matched with a KD assignment. Notice that if an Officer needing a KD assign-
ment is matched to a broadening assignment, it contributes no value to the objective
function. Likewise, the assignments of KD-complete Officers have no bearing on this
value beyond the missed opportunity costs of occupying a KD assignment in lieu of
an Officer who needs it.
Objective 2: Officer Preferences.
f2(X) ≈XP =
∑
i∈O
∑
j∈A
xijpij. (11)
Equation 11 measures the quality of a matching by using the preference information
of each Officer and the decision matrixX. Minimizing this quantity seeks the greatest
number of Officers their highest rated assignments, taking into account the varying
preferences that Officers may have. As discussed both in Section 1.4, and in the
definition of P above, this approximation is subject to error because the measurement
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of ordinal preferences imposes a linear scale onto the values collected.
Objective 3: Stability.
f3(X) =
{
The number of blocking pairs contained in the matching X
}
. (12)
The third objective function measures the stability present in a solution. As noted
in Section 2.2, a matching is stable if the number of blocking pairs is zero. Stability
of a matching X is measured by the number of blocking pairs in that matching. The
fewer the number of blocking pairs, the greater the stability of a match. To maximize
stability we minimize the number of blocking pairs.
Objective 4: Assignment Preference.
f4(X) ≈ CX =
∑
i∈O
∑
j∈A
cijxij. (13)
This last objective function describes the overall assignment preference level for
the matching, in a manner similar to the calculation of Officer preference in Objective
2.
3.4 Linear Programming Base Model.
The Linear Programming Model seeks to minimize the collective regret of Officers
using an objective function similar to the measure of Social Welfare [10] discussed
in Chapter 2. In this sense, we seek to minimize the regret of an Officer incurred
by her assigned posting compared to that which would be personally optimal herself.
Furthermore, we seek to simultaneously minimize the regret of assignments when
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their assigned Officer is compared with the entire set. Of course, this optimization is
subject to some additional constraints, representing the equities and requirements of
the Army.
lex min
X∈U
(
f1(X), f2(X) + f4(X)
)
subject to
∑
i∈O
xij = 1, ∀j ∈ A,∑
j∈A
xij = 1, ∀i ∈ O,
xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ O, j ∈ A,
(14)
By exploiting knowledge of the problem, specifically the structure of the set par-
titions and their influence on f1, and using the approximation of f2 in Equation (11)
we can reformulate the multiobjective lexicographic minimization in Equation (14)
into the optimization of Equation (15). We solve for the best attainable value of KD
assignment utilization, k∗, and then add a constraint to Equation (15) using k∗ as a
constant.
min
X∈U
∑
i∈O
∑
j∈A
xij(pij + cij)
subject to
∑
i∈O
xij = 1, j ∈ A,∑
j∈A
xij = 1, ∀i ∈ O,∑
i∈OKD
∑
j∈AKD
yixij = k
∗,
xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ O, j ∈ A.
(15)
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where k∗ = min
Z∈U
∑
i∈OKD
∑
j∈AKD
yizij
subject to
∑
i∈O
zij = 1, j ∈ A,∑
j∈A
zij = 1, ∀i ∈ O,
zij ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ O, j ∈ A.
(16)
The LP is modeled using the numpy [30] and gurobipy [31] packages of the Python
programming language and solved using Gurobi’s version 7.0.1 mixed integer pro-
gramming solver [13]. Since the lower level program (16) is independent from the
decision variables of the upper-level program in (15), k∗ need only be found once and
substituted into subsequent formulations as a parameter.
In solving the LPs above, we employ two methods. The initial solution for both LP
variants is the same. The cold start LP does not “seed” the solver with these initial
decision variable values, but rather will start from an initial feasible basis, such as
a heuristically derived solution. The warm start LP uses the values of the decision
variables in the initial solution as a guide, attempting to redress any infeasibility while
searching for the new optimal value [31]. Since these methods attain an optimal
solution we can state that, for identical instance, the two methods may diverge if
and only if alternative optimal solutions exist. While alternative optimal solutions
might exist in cases of a pair of Officers with identical preferences over some subset of
assignments, additional solutions with the same objective value might also arise from
more complex chain of “swaps” involving a larger number of Officers, but resulting in
the same objective function value. We hypothesize that there should be no difference,
on average, between the solutions obtained via these two methods.
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3.5 Stable Marriage Model
As in the case of the LP, we extracted from the exemplar data the assignment
preferences for each Officer. To properly represent Army priorities, we constructed a
preference listing for each assignment over the set of available Officers. The resulting
partially ordered set, or poset, of Officers will complement the preferences of the
Officers over assignments. The GS deferred acceptance algorithm, or Stable Marriage
Algorithm, is then used with these two posets to identify stable matchings.
In a traditional optimization formulation, as shown in Equation (17), we seek to
first optimize the distribution of KD assignments, or f1, and then generate a stable
solution by minimizing f3. The Stable Marriage Algorithm by design minimizes the
number of blocking pairs by generating a stable solution, which by definition contains
no blocking pairs. However, it is likely that there exist multiple matchings without
blocking pairs, and the algorithm will only return one of multiple alternative optima.
lex min
X∈U
(
f1(X), f3(X)
)
subject to
∑
i∈O
xij = 1, ∀j ∈ A,∑
j∈A
xij = 1, ∀i ∈ O,
xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ O, j ∈ A.
(17)
The Stable Marriage Algorithm requires preference information for both assign-
ments and Officers. While the preferences of Officer over assignments are available,
we must construct the preferences for each assignment over the group of Officers such
that the “Needs of the Army” represented by f1 are taken into account. To do this,
we construct a preference relation for each assignment based upon the nature of the
assignment. While we could account for several factors, in this example our primary
concern is the distribution of KD assignments.
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For i, j ∈ O and an assignment in AKD, we establish a weak preference relation
such that i  j if either of the following conditions are true:
• Officer i requires KD and Officer j does not; i ∈ OKD ∧ j ∈ OB,
• Officer i has a lower or “older” year group than Officer j; yi < yj.
If both Officers have the same KD status and year group, then the assignment is
indifferent between i and j, or i ∼ j. Just as with ties among Officer preferences,
there is a lack of a strict ordering (i.e. there are ties) within the preferences of the
assignments.
We similarly construct a relation for Officers for assignments in AB, preferring
KD-complete Officers (OB) to those requiring KD (OKD) without prejudice to year
group. While we model assignments in AD with no preference, alternatively they
could model some expressed preference with respect to how long or how often an
Officer has previously been required to change duty locations, given by tour equity
or date of their last move
(
i.e., permanent change of station (PCS)
)
.
It should be noted that additional preference information for assignments, whether
for certain experiences, skill identifiers, or manner of past performance could be easily
incorporated at this point. Whether it is to ensure a nominative position is filled by
a high performing officer or to match an assignment with a mechanized unit with an
Officer with similar experience as a junior Officer, the options are limited only by the
availability of data for use by assignment managers to implement a desired manning
strategy.
The Stable Marriage Algorithm is then applied to determine a stable solution,
with Officers proposing to assignments. Each Officer is then paired with the best
assignment he might obtain without either another Officer being worse off. Assum-
ing all Officers expressed their true preferences, then by the definition of stability
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there should not exist any allowable “trade” among Officers that would improve the
outcome for both Officers.
Since Kimbrough and Kuo [10]observed that solution characteristics might vary
among stable matchings, we test several variants of the GS algorithm by varying how
the proposing “male” or Officer is picked, whether the initial solution is used, and
whether and how the best of multiple applications is used. The variants selected for
test are shown in Table 6. For those that are described as randomized, the choice
of the male or Officer at each step in the algorithm is by a random selection from
the currently unmatched Officers. The lexicographic method simply chooses the next
Officer in the list.
3.6 Perturbations to the Models
After the procedures in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 are applied, the resulting matching
is stored as the incumbent solution and the respective model subjected to a combi-
nation of three possible alterations. Two additional possible changes are discussed
and shown to be isomorphic to the three under study. For ten iterations at each
combination, zero to five random instances of each additional constraint are gener-
ated. The incumbent solutions are then compared with the final solutions from the
Table 6. Variants of SMA and LP under test
Variant Abbreviation
SMA, Randomized with Lowest Objective Value of 5 iterations SMA-5o
SMA, Randomized with Fewest Changes of 5 iterations SMA-5r
SMA, Randomized with Fewest Changes of 10 iterations SMA-10r
SMA, Randomized with Fewest Changes of 30 iterations SMA-30r
LP, Cold Start LP-C
LP, Warm Start LP-W
SMA, Lexicographic SMA-Lex
SMA, Lexicographic with Warmstart SMA-Lex/Warm
SMA, Randomized with Warmstart SMA-Warm
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updated model and the number of differences between the solutions are counted. In
application, this approach of randomly selecting possible scenarios is known in the
stochastic optimization field as a scenario optimization [32]. In addition to providing
an immediate benefit of examining the Officer assignment decision under conditions
of uncertainty, this approach also provides the opportunity to empirically compare
the performance of the stable marriage heuristic with traditional linear programming
techniques with respect to solution quality and stability.
Assignment Restriction.
An assignment restriction changes the model such that a subset of A becomes
infeasible for that Officer. In practice, such an occurrence happens when life events
cause an Officer to enroll in a program such as the Exceptional Family Member
Program (EFMP) or the Married Army Couples Program (MACP). These programs
may limit the assignment of an Officer, even to a desired posting. Another possibility
might be duty limitations due to injury or illness preventing assignment to some units,
such as Airborne status or those deploying in support of overseas operations.
Directed Assignment.
A directed assignment occurs when a particular Officer is directed to fill a particular
assignment. Whether due to a by-name request (BNR) from a particular unit or the
intervention of a senior decision maker into the process, these assignments take into
account information that may not be routinely available to assignment managers.
Rejected Match.
Due to how Officers are assigned to Joint and Interservice assignments, also called
Joint and nominative assignment, some units may exert influence over which Officer
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they receive by effectively exercising a “veto” power. After an assignment manager
“nominates” an Officer, a unit with such power undertakes its own review or interview
process before approving or rejecting the nomination.
Unforecasted Assignment.
New assignment requirements sometimes occur. This might be due to rapidly un-
folding situations, such as the establishment of a new joint task force headquarters
(e.g., combat operations). Life events of an Officer in a high-priority unit, such as a
new medical condition or legal action, might necessitate a reassignment. Depending
upon priority and timing, the replacement might need to occur in the current as-
signment cycle. In application, this situation need not be explicitly modeled due to
the presence of “dummy” assignments in the algorithms. Without any further pref-
erence information available for either Officers or assignments, there is no structural
difference between an unforecasted assignment and the absence of an assignment. In
practice, some degree of preference might be inferred, but the model examined herein
assumes that no such information is available and does not explicitly model such
information. However, should such information become available, it could be easily
incorporated into the model.
Removal of an Officer.
Life events, such as medical concerns, legal trouble, or personal career decisions
might impact the availability of an Officer for reassignment. Despite many media
portrayals, the Army’s processes account for these in its reassignment decisions. Of-
ficers might retire in-lieu of a reassignment, or request a stabilization so that a high
school-aged child does not have to move to a new school for their senior year. In ap-
plication, this situation is analogous to a directed assignment described above, except
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that the Officer is directed to a “dummy” assignment. As modeled, that Officer is
effectively removed from the process.
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IV. Analysis
4.1 Robustness of Approaches with Respect to Changes in Solution
C
h
an
ge
s
Approach Variant
Variant Abbreviation
LP, Cold Start LP-Cold
LP, Warm Start LP-Warm
SMA, Randomized with Fewest Changes of 10 iterations SMA-10r
SMA, Randomized with Fewest Changes of 30 iterations SMA-30r
SMA, Randomized with Lowest Objective Value of 5 iterations SMA-5o
SMA, Randomized with Fewest Changes of 5 iterations SMA-5r
SMA, Lexicographic SMA-Lex
SMA, Lexicographic with Warmstart SMA-Lex,Warm
SMA, Randomized with Warmstart SMA-Warm
Figure 2. Robustness (Changes to Incumbent Solution) By Method
Figure 2 shows the mean number of changes to an incumbent solution for a number
of randomly chosen perturbations, where each of the three types are equally likely
to occur. In this formulation, lower is better. The numeric values, along with 95%
Scheffe´ confidence intervals [33], are shown in Table 7. All contrasts between the
mean robustness of each methods are statistically significant, with the exception of
the two LP methods. This indicates that for any two variants, except for the two
LP methods, there is sufficient evidence to reject a null hypothesis that there is no
difference between the mean robustness of the two approaches. For the warm and
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cold start LPs, there is insufficient evidence to reject the assertion that there is no
difference in mean robustness.
Table 7. Mean Number of Changes with 95% Scheffe´ Confidence Intervals [33]
95% Scheffe´ CI
Groups Solution Method for Mean Changes
a SMA, Randomized with Best Objective of 5 iterations 84.40± 6.94
b SMA, Randomized with Fewest Changes of 5 iterations 76.52± 5.06
c SMA, Randomized with Fewest Changes of 10 iterations 73.80± 4.73
d SMA, Randomized with Fewest Changes of 30 iterations 70.51± 4.12
e
LP 62.31± 8.18
LP with Warm Start 61.64± 8.24
f SMA, Lexicographic 48.89± 8.76
g SMA, Lexicographic with Warmstart 10.79± 5.12
g SMA, Randomized with Warmstart 10.39± 4.76
4.2 Computational Effort
In Table 8, we examine computational effort, as measured by elapsed time, on
an Intel Core i5-7200U CPU (2 Cores) with hyperthreading enabled running Ubuntu
16.10 in an Anaconda 4.2-managed Python 2.7.12 environment. Of note, most SMA
iterations can be run in the same time as an LP and, given the context of the Army
Assignment problem, there is no practical difference between even the smallest ob-
served value (0.271 seconds) and the largest (7.39 seconds). The lack of practical
difference, however, likely would not extend to larger scale problem instances and
certainly is not generalizable to other problems.
4.3 Similarities of Cold Start and Warm Start Linear Programming
Further examining the previously noted similarity of the two LP methods, Table
9 highlights the further similarity of the two LP methods with respect to objective
function value and the average choice of assignment given to Officers. With such
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Table 8. Computational Effort as Elapsed Time with 95% Scheffe´ Confidence Inter-
vals [33]
Groups Solution Method Mean Time(s)±95% Scheffe´ CI
a SMA, Fewest Changes of 30 iterations 3.0069± 0.121
b SMA, Fewest Changes of 10 iterations 1.1289± 0.034
c
SMA, Best Objective of 5 iterations 0.6592± 0.021
SMA, Fewest Changes of 5 iterations 0.6592± 0.022
d
LP, Warm Start 0.6453± 0.020
LP, Cold Start 0.6404± 0.022
e SMA, Lexicographic 0.2811± 0.009
f
SMA, Randomized with Warmstart 0.2744± 0.006
SMA, Lexicographic with Warmstart 0.2682± 0.014
high similarity in solution quality, computational effort, and number of changes, it is
reasonable to conclude that there is no significant difference, on average, between the
two variations of Linear Programming.
Table 9. Solution Quality of LP Methods, with 95% Scheffe´ Confidence Intervals [33]
Variant Mean Objective Average Officer Preference
LP Warm Start 70960± 265 16.03598± 0.769
LP Cold Start 70980± 301 16.08598± 0.784
4.4 Regression of Perturbation Type against the Number of Changes to
Initial Solution
Relaxing the assumption that each type of perturbation under test occurs with
equal frequency, we build a regression model to estimate the change attributable to
each factor. The three factors are the number of restrictions, directed assignments
and rejected assignments added after deriving the initial solution. We developed two
models, one based upon the data observed for warm start LP and the other based
upon the “best of five, changes focused” randomized SMA. The two regression models
show that, while the two methods in general respond similarly to directed and rejected
assignments, the algorithms respond much differently to the addition of assignment
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restrictions. Lastly, the difference in intercepts reinforce observations noted in Figure
2, namely that for this dataset the LP method requires fewer changes on average than
SMA.
LP Method.
We regress the warm start LP data against the observed changes to our initial
solution. To remove non-constant variance in the response, we apply a Box-Cox
transformation [34] to the number of changes, resulting in an estimated λ-parameter
of 1.9. A model with all interaction terms was iteratively reduced in R [35], yield-
ing a model with no interaction terms with all terms significant at the 0.001 level. A
Breusch-Pagan [36] test failed to reject a null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. Variance
inflation factors, approximately one, indicate there are no issues with multicollinearity
of the data. While there are three potentially large (> 3) externally studentized resid-
uals, in such a large data set three observations this extreme match those expected
from a t-distribution [35].
changesLP-Warm = (1000.03 + 83.63nrestrictions + 81.52ndirected + 58.70nrejected)
1
1.9 (18)
Equation (18) shows the regression model, where nrestrictions is the number of
assignment restrictions added, ndirected is the number of directed assignments and
nrejected is the number of assignments rejected in the incumbent matching. For LPs,
restrictions are the largest contributor to changes. LP is least robust to restrictions,
and more robust to rejected matches.
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SMA Method.
Fewest changes of five iterations with randomized selection (SMA-
5r).
Similarly, we construct a regression model for the “best of five” SMA method
where the best is selected by lowest number of changes rather than objective function
value. Box-Cox [34] suggested a λ-value of 2, accounting for non-constant variance in
the response. We developed a model with the three factors and no interaction. The
model and all terms were significant at the 0.05 level or better. A Breusch-Pagan test
[36] failed to reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity, and as expected there was
no indication of multicollinearity within the factors. Also, as with the LP regression
model, the number of large externalized residuals falls within the expected range [35].
changesSMA-5r =
√
2625.60− 11.56nrestrictions + 82.63ndirected + 61.95nrejected (19)
Equation (19) shows the regression model for the SMA algorithm, where nrestrictions
is the number of assignment restrictions added, ndirected is the number of directed
assignments, and nrejected is the number of assignments rejected in the incumbent
matching. A larger intercept shows the generally lower performance of this algo-
rithm, but the interesting observation is the reduction in changes with an increase in
assignment restrictions. The model predicts a decrease in the number of changes, on
average, for an increase in the number of additional restrictions.
Warm Start (SMA-Warm).
For the responses of the warm start SMA, the Box-Cox method [34] suggested
a transform with a λ-value of 0.7, resulting in the relationship shown in Equation
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(20). Residual analysis and application of the Breusch-Pagan test [36] highlighted no
problems with model adequacy.
changesSMA-Warm = (0.734 + 0.072nrestrictions + 1.22ndirected + 0.98nrejected)
10
7 (20)
The coefficient value for the number of restrictions (nrestrictions) was statistically
insignificant (p = 0.395). This means that based upon the observed data, there is
insufficient evidence to reject an assertion that restrictions do not cause changes to the
model, or that the true coefficient value is zero. Intuitively, we would expect a solution
to change only with the probability that the restriction impacts the assignment made
within the initial solution. Therefore, we reason a priori that restrictions impact the
number of changes, but the magnitude of the effect is small. However, it is possible
that the true value may even be negative, confirming the observation made for a cold
starting SMA.
An empirical justification for retaining the term nrestrictions results from examina-
tion of the predicted residual error sum of squares, or PRESS, statistics for models
both with and without the term for the number of restrictions [35]. In Table 10 we see
that there is a small decline in the sum of squares of the PRESS residuals, indicating
some small increase in predictive power in the expanded model. Given our a priori
reasoning above, and the observed PRESS values, we determined that the model in
Equation (20) is appropriate.
Table 10. Prediction Residual Error Sum of Squares (PRESS) for SMA-Warm Regres-
sion Model
Model PRESS Statistic
Restrictions, Directed and Rejected Assignments 78,817.37
Directed and Rejected Assignments 78,849.71
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4.5 Solution Quality
Table 11 displays the average objective function value, f2 + f4 for each of the
solution methods. We note that the use of lexicographic selection in the SMA, which
appears to provide much of the reduction in changes, imposes a cost with respect to
solution quality.
Table 11. Solution Quality with Groupings from 95% Scheffe´ Confidence Intervals [33]
Objective Value
Treatment Mean 95% CI Group∗
SMA-Lex 72780 a
SMA-Lex,Warm 72460 b
SMA-5o 72400 bc
SMA-5c 72380 c
SMA-10c 72380 c
SMA-30c 72360 c
SMA-Warm 72240 d
LP-C 70980 e
LP-W 70960 e
∗Treatments sharing a letter are statistically equivalent
4.6 Pareto-Optimality of Solution Approaches
Based upon the observed data, a trade-off appears to exist between reductions
in the number of changes and reductions in objective function value. Lexicographic
SMA and warm start LP are both Pareto-optimal approaches, in this bi-objective
comparison of quality and robustness. For the two objectives of quality and robust-
ness, an approach is Pareto-Optimal if changing approaches to improve one objective
necessitates a decrease with respect to the other objective [37].
To compare the LP-Warm, SMA-Lex and SMA-Warm results, we construct a
conditioning plot of the data as shown in Figure 3. Here the data for each method
are plotted side-by-side, with solution quality (i.e., the objective function value) on
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Figure 3. Plot of Efficient Frontier for Mean Solution Quality and Mean Robustness
the vertical axis and the number of changes observed on the horizontal axis. The
lower left corner of each plot is the utopia point, optimizing both solution robustness
and solution quality.
By inspection we can see that the LP method stochastically dominates the lexi-
cographic SMA approach, in that we expect to perform at least as well if not better
with respect to both measures when choosing LP over this SMA variant. With this
observation, we can exclude this variant of SMA from the set of Pareto-Optimal ap-
proaches [37]. A comparison of the LP-Warm and SMA-Warm approaches shows
that, in order to improve over the quality of SMA-Warm, we must change to an the
LP-Warm approach that sacrifices robustness, and vice versa. Figure 4 simplifies the
graph to examine only the means of each measure.
As both measures are formulated for minimization, a Utopian point is the closest
point to the origin. On the graph, a notional Utopian point is noted for reference in
the bottom left. We can clearly observe that the lexicographic variant (SMA-Lex)
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lays on average behind the efficient frontier established by the two warm starting
methods (SMA-Warm and LP-Warm). The relative weighting by a decision maker of
the importance of quality over robustness will determine which side of the trade-off
is preferable.
Figure 4. Plot of Solution Quality versus Robustness for Three Variants, with the
Utopian Point Annotated
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V. Conclusions and Future Research
The Army’s most important weapon is its people. Where the other ser-
vices may man equipment, what we do is equip the Soldiers, the women
and men who are the Army. That’s where talent management comes into
play.
–LTG James McConville, 9 January 2017
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Headquarters, United States Army [38]
5.1 Conclusion
Pareto-Optimality of Approaches.
Based upon the observed data and our analysis of results in Section 4.6, we con-
clude for this problem instance that cold start SMA approaches do not appear Pareto-
Optimal with respect to solution quality and robustness. More information is required
from the decision-maker to examine the trade-off between the two measures, to as-
certain is how much of a loss in solution quality should be sacrificed for solution
robustness. If greater weight is given to robustness, then a warm-started SMA ap-
proach might increase robustness at the cost of quality. If instead solution quality is
preferred, then a warm-started LP formulation is more appropriate.
Robustness Impacts of Differing Constraints on Approaches.
Assignment Restrictions.
The regression analysis performed in Section 4.4 appears to indicate that for SMA
approaches robustness, as measured by the number of changes required to an incum-
bent matching after the inclusion of additional model constraints, appears to increase
with an increase in the number of additional assignment restrictions. In other words,
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increasing restrictions in a sparse preference structure appears to positively influence
solution robustness in SMA approaches. This reaction can be contrasted with the
observation that assignment restrictions are the most impactful constraint on LP
formulations.
Directed and Rejected Assignments.
Directed assignments yielded the greatest impact over all SMA variants, whereas
rejected assignments yielded the lowest impact on LP approaches. The impact of
these observations depend upon an understanding of the relative frequency of these
events occurring. Further observations or discussions with assignment managers may
help inform follow-on analysis.
Development of an Officer-Assignment Matching Market.
Given the pervasive requirement to adjust the various methods used by Officers to
communicate their preferences, discussed further in Appendix A, we note the benefit
likely raised by automating the collection of Officer preference data through any
standardized process with any form of integrated data validation. Such a process will
likely reduce many transcription errors that might unnecessarily cloud the problem
and reduce the quality of the resulting solution.
Development of a formal matching market system may ease the adoption of SMA
by improving the availability of preference information elicited directly from Army
leaders, without requiring an explicit mathematical modeling of a preference func-
tion for each assignment. The additional input leaders would have in determining
the Officers that they receive might motivate an increase the preference information
available to any algorithm used. If these preferences are collected as ordinal prefer-
ences with a low degree of indifference, then it may benefit from the application of
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the GS algorithm.
5.2 Future Research
Will a Reduction in Assignment Indifference Result in an Improvement
of Stochastic SMA approaches?
One characteristic of the problem under consideration is that the preference infor-
mation for assignments over the set of all Officers is more sparse than the preference
information elicited from the Officers. While this is partially an artifact of the avail-
able data, additional research could identify how a more granular preference structure
might be reasonably developed. These might include the use of information regarding
an Officer’s manner of performance or the use of preference information elicited from
units regarding Officer traits available in Army databases.
A new hypothesis from this observation is that, if preference information for the set
of Assignments contained less indifference, the performance gap between LP and SMA
approaches may be reduced. Follow-on work may test this hypothesis, the results of
which can better inform when it might preferable to utilize any one methodology.
What potential impact does the use of ordinal preference structures
have relative to the actual or theoretical preferences of Officers?
As noted in Chapter 2, there is scant literature regarding the impact of our study’s
assumption of a linear preference relationship of assignments by all Officers. Left to
future investigation is an assessment of the full impact of this assumption, as well
as a full accounting of the costs to gather the additional information. A compari-
son, either empirically or theoretically, of the marginal changes in solution quality
between ordinal and ratio preference information can inform the potential benefits of
increased information. This might be weighed against an accounting or more rigorous
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estimation of the costs associated with eliciting a large number of preference func-
tions. Once informed with a better understanding of the potential costs and benefits,
Army leaders can make an informed decision regarding the continued use of ordinal
information.
Relaxation of Pre-emptive Goal Program.
While the use of a lexicographic preference order in our LP formulation enabled its
transformation into a relatively simple bi-level program, it is possible that a decision-
maker’s goals might not be so strict, allowing for some flexibility in the allocation of
KD-Assignments. Developing a “Nearly Pre-emptive Goal Programming” approach
would allow relatively minor deviations from the optimal value designated as k∗ in
our formulation. Given more flexibility, this modified LP approach might further
improve the overall quality of the matching attained and better reflect the decision
process of Assignment Managers.
Alternative Program Formulations.
A mathematical program might be formulated to minimize the number of devia-
tions to an incumbent solution, or at least to incorporate and appropriately weight
their number within the objective. Such a formulation may be able to provide ad-
ditional approaches by which uncertainty could be addressed. A comparison to the
methods described herein could prove enlightening, as a method to produce additional
Pareto-optimal approaches to the problem.
Probabilistic Analysis of Scenario Frequency.
While this study examines the impact of the three scenario-based changes, it is
likely that these scenarios do not occur with equal probability. The collection of data
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and additional study can inform how often each scenario occurs for the various popu-
lations, and whether it might change the approach recommended for some weighting
of quality and robustness.
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Appendix A. Data Cleaning
Reviewing the data received by the United States Army Human Resources Com-
mand (HRC), we discovered multiple instances of errors that might complicate any
interpretation of Officer preferences. We summarize the various types of errors, how
they are handled, and recommend an automated data validation schema appropriate
for distributed and unsupervised data collection. We received an assignment work-
sheet with the collected ordinal preferences from a single assignment cycle for a single
group of Officers.
We identified and characterized artifacts in the data as multiple preference values,
skipped preference values, incomplete preferences, assignments annotated as “N/A”
and a single Officer who did not express any preferences at all. Overall, about one in
three Officer preferences contained at least one error or potential ambiguity, as noted
in the first bar of Figure 5. The relative frequency of errors in the remaining bars
does not sum to the overall error rate, as many preferences contained more than one
type of error.
Figure 5. Observed Data Cleaning Errors
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Most errors were likely typos, resulting from multiple iterations of copying and
editing a list before submitting a final preference list to the assignment manager for
manual transfer to the master copy. The coincidence of skipped numbers and multiple
entries is intuitive. For instance, if there are two of one number and another number is
later skipped, the final preference value will match the number of assignments, making
it easier to overlook the compound error. While the majority of these artifacts were
not proximate, we viewed that there was not an immediate concern and accept the
values, as-is.
Multiple entries for a single preference value occur when an Officer assigns the same
number to multiple assignments. We interpret this artifact as indifference between
the two assignments and update our preference structure accordingly. While most
of these errors might be rather innocuous, there is still the possibility for serious
error. For example Officer 103 noted two assignments as her number 3 choice, but
skipped the preference value 30. It is possible that, by assuming indifference between
those assignments, we do not accurately model the true preferences of an Officer who
possibly intended one to be assigned 30.
Incomplete preferences occur when no number at all was assigned to one or more
assignments. We separately account for a single incident where not a single preferences
was noted, but this is but an extreme case of incomplete preferences. Otherwise, the
most extreme case was an Officer who submitted preferences over only 17 assignments.
We also examined several cases where the Officer annotated “N/A” rather than an
integer value. Upon further investigation, there was no information that indicated the
Officer might be precluded from such an assignment. When no preference information
is available, either by a blank or “N/A” entry, we assume that the Officer is indifferent
between all such entries and append these to our preference structure accordingly.
Manual inspection and identification of these artifacts, as well as confirming any
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interpretation via an individual contact with each Officer would likely be time and cost
prohibitive. While an automated tool might help to identify such artifacts and even
facilitate communication, the prevention of such errors would alleviate the problem
at the source.
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Appendix B. Code Documentation
assignmentFunction(initialSolution, allowableChanges, methodFlag): assignment-
Function returns a matching provided by a desired solution method (set by method-
Flag) given a starting solution that is to be randomly altered according to the allow-
ableChanges parameter. Solution time is also returned. assignmentFunction requires
Python 2.7 with the ability to import the gurobipy, pandas and numpy packages (also
inheriting integer division behavior from Python3).
Function inputs:
– initialSolution: a list of integer assignment indices such that initialSolution[i] =
j iff Officer i is assigned to assignment j.
– allowableChanges: a list of integers representing the number of randomly chosen
changes to the original assignment problem. For each change type i, j changes
will be made iff allowableChanges[i]=j.
allowableChanges[0]: Assignment Restrictions. Generate lists of assign-
ments for allowableChanges[0] number of Officers such that the inclusion
of any selected assignment for that Officer results in an infeasible match-
ing. This change models widely impacting personal situations such as the
Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP), enrollment in the Mar-
ried Army Couples Program (MACP), or deploy-ability restrictions such
as medical profiles, or other restrictions on assignment with a wider impact
on assignment feasibility.
allowableChanges[1]: Directed Assignments. Randomly select allowableChanges[1]
number of Officers and directs their assignment to a randomly selected as-
signment. This models the influence of a by-name request (BNR), or the
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executive judgment of senior decision-makers acting upon additional infor-
mation not routinely available to assignment managers.
allowableChanges[2]: Rejected Match. Randomly selects allowableChanges[2]
number of Officers and determines if their current match (that is, the ap-
propriate entry in initialSolution) is infeasible. This models the post-hoc
influence of some individual assignments over the results of the Officer
assignment process. Prototypically joint and nominative positions, these
assignments can exercise a “veto” over the choice of a service’s assignment
manager.
– method flag: Designates the method by which the changed/new assignment
problem instance is solved.
methodFlag = 0:SMAWarmstart Returns a matching found by using a
Stable Marriage Algorithm, starting with the values in initialSolution.
methodFlag = 1:SMAColdstart Returns a matching found by using a Sta-
ble Marriage Algorithm, without specifying an initial solution.
methodFlag = 2:LPWarmstart Returns a matching found by using a Lin-
ear Programming model, with a warm-start using the values in initialSo-
lution.
methodFlag = 3:LPColdstart Returns a matching found by using a Linear
Programming model, without specifying an initial solution.
Function outputs: The function returns an object (of a “Solution” class or a
tuple- depending upon implementation) consisting of:
– finalSolution: a list of integer assignment indices such that initialSolution[i] =
j iff Officer i is assigned to assignment j.
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– computationTime: a floating point representation of the computational effort
expended on evaluation of the changed assignment problem. The exact deter-
mination of this value will depend upon implementations of timing routines in
the underlying operating system.
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Appendix C. Python Code
The following code was written for Python [39] using numpy [30] and gurobipi [13].
import numpy as np
import pandas as pd
import pickle as pkl
#two helper functions to save and load python objects
def save obj(obj, name ):
with open(’data/’+ name + ’.pkl’, ’wb’) as f:
pkl.dump(obj, f, pkl.HIGHEST PROTOCOL)
def load obj(name ):
with open(’data/’ + name + ’.pkl’, ’rb’) as f:
return pkl.load(f)
#Solution Class provides means of return more than one value
class Solution:
def init (self, fS, rSF, c): #add msg?
self.finalSolution = fS
self.resultStatusFlag = rSF
self.changes= c
self.obj = 0.0
self.feasible = 1
def str (self): #when called via print
return str([self.finalSolution , self.obj, self.feasible, self.changes])
def repr (self): #when called interactively
return str([self.finalSolution , self.obj, self.feasible, self.changes])
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def setup():
LPGetYearGroup()
SMAGetPrefs()
LPGetC()
#Generates ’p.pkl’ file containing Officer preference
#dictionary only needs to be run once on a machine
#setup for use as a stack (pop/append) in reverse preference
#order. Stack contains sublists for each level of
#indifference (weak preference order)
def SMAGetPrefs():
import numpy as np
import pandas as pd
p kd = {}
p b = {}
KD Off= range(74,160)
B Off = range(0, 74)
KD Ass= range(0,71)
B Ass = range(73,139)
D Ass = range(139, 162)
KD D Ass = B Ass[0:15]
Officers = list(set().union(KD Off ,B Off))
Assignments = list(set().union(KD Ass , B Ass , D Ass))
raw pref = pd.read csv(’RawPreferences2.csv’, dtype=’str’)
#worst case, 72nd choice
raw pref.fillna(max(KD Ass)+1,inplace=True)
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for o in Officers:
p kd[o] = map(int,raw pref.iloc[o,KD Ass])
for i in range(0,2):
p kd[o].append(999) #missing assignments 71/72
for a in KD D Ass:
p kd[o].append(a)
p b[o] = map(int,raw pref.iloc[o,B Ass])
for a in D Ass:
p b[o].append(a)
save obj(p kd , ’p kd’)
save obj(p b , ’p b’)
Officers = list(set().union(KD Off ,B Off))
Assignments = list(set().union(KD Ass , B Ass , D Ass))
r kd = {}
r b = {}
raw pref = pd.read csv(’RawPreferences2.csv’, dtype=’str’)
for o in Officers:
r=raw pref.iloc[o,KD Ass]
r.fillna(max(KD Ass)+1,inplace=True) #worst case scenario
r kd[o] = map(int,r)
r = raw pref.iloc[o,B Ass]
r.fillna(max(B Ass)+1,inplace=True)
r b[o] = map(int,r)
for a in D Ass:
r b[o].append(0)
save obj(r kd , ’r kd’)
save obj(r b , ’r b’)
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#Generates ’y.pkl’ file containing yeargroup list.
#Only needs to be run once on a machine
def LPGetYearGroup():
d = pd.read csv(’OfficerData.csv’)
y = d[’YG’]
y = y.values.tolist()
save obj(y, ’y’)
yg={}
for o, year in enumerate(y):
try:
yg[year].append(o)
except (KeyError, NameError):
yg[year]=[o]
save obj(yg,’yg’)
#Generates ’C.pkl’ file containing cost coefficient list.
#Only needs to be run once on a machine
def LPGetC():
KD Off= range(74,160)
B Off = range(0, 74)
KD Ass= range(0,71)
B Ass = range(73,139)
D Ass = range(139, 162)
y = load obj(’y’)
years = {}
for i,year in enumerate(y):
years[i] = (y[i]−min(y))
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Officers = list(set().union(KD Off ,B Off))
Assignments = list(set().union(KD Ass , B Ass , D Ass))
C = {}
prefs ={}
officer preference = pd.read csv(’OfficerPrefs.csv’)
for o in Officers:
prefs[o] = officer preference[str(o)]
for a in Assignments:
if a in list(D Ass):
C[(o,a)] = 1.6 ∗ (max(years)−years[o])
elif not np.isnan(prefs[o][a]):
if o in KD Off and a in KD Ass:
penalty = 160∗years[o]
elif o in KD Off and a in B Ass:
penalty = 160 ∗(max(years)−years[o])
elif o in B Off and a in KD Ass:
penalty = 160
elif o in B Off and a in B Ass:
penalty = 0
else:
pass
C[(o,a)] = prefs[o][a] + penalty
else: #mildly infeasible , no KD prefs avail
C[(o,a)]= 999
save obj(C,’C’)
#Base SMA Code
def SMA(allowableChanges):
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import random as rnd
sol = Solution([0,0], 1, 0)
#sets
KD Off= range(74,160)
KD Ass= range(0,71)
B Off = range(0, 74)
B Ass = range(73,139)
D Ass = range(139, 162)
Officers = list(set().union(KD Off ,B Off))
#Assignments = list(set().union(KD Ass , B Ass))
Assignments = list(set().union(KD Ass , B Ass , D Ass))
#Match KD Assignments
KD D Ass = B Ass[0:15]
p kd = load obj(’p kd’)
p b = load obj(’p b’)
yg = load obj(’yg’)
y = load obj(’y’)
smaA = load obj(’smaA’)
KD OtoA = {}
BOtoA = {}
res list = {}
#allowableChanges[0]: Assignment Restrictions
availO = set(Officers)
restrictions = rnd.sample(list(availO), allowableChanges[0])
for restriction in restrictions:
res list[restriction] = rnd.sample(Assignments , int(rnd.uniform
(.05,.1) ∗ len(Assignments)))
for ass in res list[restriction]:
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if ass in KD Ass and restriction in KD Off:
p kd[restriction][ass] = max(Assignments) + 2
elif ass in B Ass:
p b[restriction][ass−min(B Ass)] = max(Assignments) + 2
else:
pass
#allowableChanges[1]: Directed Assignment
taken = []
x = {}
availO −= set(restrictions)
availA = set().union(KD Ass , B Ass , D Ass)
directeds = rnd.sample(list(availO), allowableChanges[1])
for directed in directeds:
#if directed in KD Off:
#KD Off.remove(directed)
#else:
#B Off.remove(directed)
#x[directed]=rnd.sample(list(availA), 1)[0]
if directed in KD Off:
x[directed]=rnd.sample(list(set(availA)−set(B Ass)), 1)[0]
KD OtoA[directed] = x[directed]
else:
x[directed]=rnd.sample(list(set(availA)−set(KD Ass)), 1)[0]
BOtoA[directed] = x[directed]
taken += [x[directed]]
availA −= set(taken)
#allowableChanges[2]: Rejected Match
availO −= set(directeds)
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rejects = []
while len(rejects) < allowableChanges[2]:
reject = rnd.sample(list(availO), 1)[0]
if int(smaA[reject]) != 999:
rejects.append(reject)
availO.remove(reject)
if reject in KD Off and smaA[reject] in KD Ass:
p kd[reject][smaA[reject]] = max(Assignments)+2
else: #if reject in KD Off and smaA[reject] in B Ass:
#p b[reject].remove(smaA[reject])
p b[reject][smaA[reject]−min(B Ass)] = max(Assignments) + 2
del availO
del availA
#Starting KD matching
opref = {}
apref = {}
unmatched = list(set(KD Off)−set(directeds)) #listing of unmatched
officers
noKD = [] #bookkeeping for KD Officers not getting a KD Assignment
#kdNotTaken = list(set().union(set(KD Ass),set(KD D Ass) )− set(taken))
#for o in KD Off:
level= {}
for assignment in KD Ass:
apref[assignment] = {}
preference = 0
for year in sorted(yg.keys()):
preference += 1
for officer in yg[year]:
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apref[assignment][officer] = preference
for assignment in KD D Ass:
apref[assignment] = {}
for officer in KD Off:
apref[assignment][officer] = −y[officer]
for officer in KD Off:
opref[officer] = p kd[officer]
level[officer] = 0
if officer not in directeds:
KD OtoA[officer] = −1
while unmatched:
officer = rnd.choice(unmatched)
#officer = unmatched[0] #lexicographic
if level[officer] > 100:
noKD.append(officer)
break
try:
possibility = opref[officer].index(level[officer])
opref[officer][possibility]=−1
except ValueError: #level not found in opref.index()
level[officer] +=1
continue
if officer in directeds or possibility in list(taken):
continue
try:
incumbent = KD OtoA.keys()[KD OtoA.values().index(possibility)]
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except ValueError:
incumbent = −1
if officer not in rejects or possibility != smaA[officer]:
possibilitypref = apref[possibility]
else: #don’t assign a reject to his incumbent match.
continue
#no incumbent
if incumbent == −1:
unmatched.remove(officer)
KD OtoA[officer] = possibility
if possibility in B Ass:
noKD.append(officer)
#if assignment prefers officer to incumbent
elif possibilitypref[officer] < possibilitypref[incumbent]:
KD OtoA[incumbent] = −1
if possibility in B Ass:
noKD.remove(incumbent)
noKD.append(officer)
unmatched.append(incumbent)
KD OtoA[officer] = possibility
unmatched.remove(officer)
else: #incumbent is preferred , do nothing
pass
del p kd #garbage collect
del yg
#Setup for Broad. Matching
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opref = {}
apref = {}
level = {}
B OtoA ={}
p b = load obj(’p b’)
unmatched = list(set(noKD + B Off)−set(directeds))
for o in unmatched:
opref[o] = p b[o]
if officer not in directeds:
B OtoA[o] = −1
level[o] = 0
for assignment in B Ass:
apref[assignment]={}
for officer in unmatched:
if officer in B Off:
apref[assignment][officer] = 1
else:
apref[assignment][officer] = 2
for assignment in D Ass:
apref[assignment] = {}
for officer in unmatched:
apref[assignment][officer] = −y[officer]
while unmatched:
officer = rnd.choice(unmatched)
#officer = unmatched[0] #lexicographic
if level[officer] > max(Assignments)+2:
print B OtoA
print str(level[officer]) +">"+str(max(Assignments)+2)
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raise ValueError
try:
possibility = opref[officer].index(level[officer])+min(B Ass)
opref[officer][possibility−min(B Ass)]=−1
except ValueError: #level not found in opref.index()
level[officer] +=1
continue
try:
incumbent = B OtoA.keys()[B OtoA.values().index(possibility)]
except ValueError:
incumbent = −1
if officer not in rejects or possibility != smaA[officer]:
possibilitypref = apref[possibility]
else: #don’t assign a reject to his incumbent match.
continue
if officer in directeds or possibility in list(taken):
continue
#no incumbent
if incumbent == −1:
unmatched.remove(officer)
B OtoA[officer] = possibility
if possibility in KD D Ass:
noKD.append(officer)
#if assignment prefers officer to incumbent
elif possibilitypref[officer] < possibilitypref[incumbent]:
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B OtoA[incumbent] = −1
if possibility in KD D Ass:
noKD.remove(incumbent)
noKD.append(officer)
unmatched.append(incumbent)
B OtoA[officer] = possibility
unmatched.remove(officer)
#incumbent is preferred , do nothing
else:
pass
for o in KD Off:
if o in noKD and o not in directeds:
x[o] = B OtoA[o]
elif o not in directeds:
x[o] = KD OtoA[o]
for o in B Off:
if o not in directeds:
x[o] = B OtoA[o]
sol.finalSolution = []
Officers = list(set().union(KD Off ,B Off))
for i in Officers:
if x[i] in D Ass or x[i] == −1:
sol.finalSolution.append(int(999))
else:
sol.finalSolution.append(x[i])
for restriction in restrictions:
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if x[restriction] in res list[restriction]:
sol.feasible = 0
for reject in rejects:
if x[reject] == smaA[reject]:
sol.feasible = 0
sol.resultStatusFlag = 0
#save obj(sol.finalSolution , ’smaA’) #saved first time, used later
sol.changes = [sum(i != j for i, j in zip(sol.finalSolution , smaA))][0]
return sol
ef af(methodFlag=1, allowableChanges=[0,0,0]): #don’t need init solution
import numpy as np
import gurobipy as gp
import random as rnd
sol = Solution([0,0], 1, 0)
#Because Python doesn’t have select−case
if methodFlag == 0: #SMA"Warmstart" −− may drop
print "not implemented"
elif methodFlag == 1: #SMAColdstart
sol = bestOfN(30, allowableChanges) #Changed for various
methodologies
elif methodFlag == 2: #LPWarmstart
kd m = gp.Model()
y = load obj(’y’)
lpA = load obj(’lpA’)
#sets
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KD Off= range(74,160)
B Off = range(0, 74)
KD Ass= range(0,71)
B Ass = range(73,139)
D Ass = range(139, 162)
D KD Ass = range(139,154)
Officers = list(set().union(KD Off ,B Off))
KD Assignments = list(set().union(KD Ass ,D KD Ass))
Assignments = list(set().union(KD Ass , B Ass , D Ass))
#handlemods/random perturbations
#allowableChanges[0]: Assignment Restrictions
restrictions = rnd.sample(Officers, allowableChanges[0])
A r = {}
for restriction in restrictions:
A r[restriction] = rnd.sample(Assignments , int(rnd.uniform(.05,.1) ∗ len
(Assignments)))
#allowableChanges[1]: Directed Assignment
A d = {}
availO = set(Officers)
availO −= set(restrictions)
directeds = rnd.sample(list(availO), allowableChanges[1])
availA = set(Assignments)
for directed in directeds:
availA −= set(A d.values())
A d[directed] = rnd.sample(list(availA), 1)
A d[directed]=A d[directed][0]
#allowableChanges[2]: Rejected Match
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availO −= set(directeds)
rejects = []
while len(rejects) < allowableChanges[2]:
reject = rnd.sample(list(availO), 1)[0]
if int(lpA[reject]) != 999:
rejects.append(reject)
availO.remove(reject)
#Phase I, slot KD Offs/objective f 1
x={}
for o in KD Off:
for a in KD Assignments:
x[(o,a)] = kd m.addVar(vtype=gp.GRB.BINARY, obj = y[o],
name="O{0:03d}".format(o) + "A{0:03d}".format(a))
kd m.ModelSense = gp.GRB.MINIMIZE #MINIMIZE
for a in KD Assignments:
kd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for o in KD Off),gp.GRB.
EQUAL ,1)
for o in KD Off:
if o in list(restrictions):
if not list(set(A r[o])&set(KD Assignments)):
kd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in
list(set(A r[o])&set(KD Ass))), gp.GRB.EQUAL
,1)
kd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in
KD Assignments),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
else:
kd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in
KD Assignments),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,0)
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elif o in list(directeds):
if A d[o] in list(KD Ass):
kd m.addConstr(x[(o,A d[o])], gp.GRB.
EQUAL ,1)
kd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in
KD Assignments),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
else:
kd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in
KD Assignments),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,0)
elif o in list(rejects):
if int(lpA[o]) in list(KD Ass):
kd m.addConstr(x[(o,int(lpA[o]))], gp.GRB.EQUAL
,0)
kd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in
KD Assignments),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
else:
kd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in
KD Assignments),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
else:
kd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in
KD Assignments),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
kd m.update()
kd m.setParam(’OutputFlag’, False)
#kd m.write(’lp.mps’)
kd m.optimize()
try:
y star = kd m.objVal
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except:
return Solution(−1∗ np.ones(160), −1, −1)
del kd m
C = load obj(’C’)
x = {} #reallocating memory
bd m = gp.Model()
for o in Officers:
for a in Assignments:
x[(o,a)] = bd m.addVar(vtype=gp.GRB.BINARY, obj=
C[(o,a)],name="O{0:03d}".format(o) + "A{0:03
d}".format(a))
bd m.ModelSense = gp.GRB.MINIMIZE #−1
for a in Assignments:
bd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for o in
Officers),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
for o in Officers:
if o in list(restrictions):
bd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in A r[o]), gp
.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
bd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in Assignments
),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
elif o in list(directeds):
bd m.addConstr(x[(o,A d[o])], gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
bd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in Assignments
),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
elif o in list(rejects):
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bd m.addConstr(x[(o,int(lpA[o]))], gp.GRB.EQUAL ,0)
bd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in Assignments
),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
else:
bd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in Assignments
),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
# bd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(gp.quicksum(y[o]∗x[(o,a)] for a in
KD Ass) for o in Officers), gp.GRB.LESS EQUAL , 1.0015∗ y star)
bd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(gp.quicksum(y[o]∗x[(o,a)] for a in
KD Ass) for o in Officers), gp.GRB.LESS EQUAL , y star)
bd m.setParam(’OutputFlag’, False)
bd m.update()
bd m.optimize()
sol.finalSolution = np.zeros(160)
#try:
for v in bd m.getVars():
if v.x >0:
if int(v.varName[−3:])>=139 or int(v.varName[−3:]) in
[71,72]:
sol.finalSolution[int(v.varName[1:4])] = 999
else:
sol.finalSolution[int(v.varName[1:4])] = int(v.varName
[−3:])
sol.finalSolution = list(sol.finalSolution.astype(int))
sol.resultStatusFlag = 0 #Good Execution
#save obj(sol.finalSolution , ’lpA’) #saved locally first time
and referenced later
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sol.changes = sum(i != j for i, j in zip(sol.finalSolution , lpA)
)
sol.obj = bd m.objVal
elif methodFlag == 3: #LPColdstart
kd m = gp.Model()
y = load obj(’y’)
lpA = load obj(’lpA’)
#sets
KD Off= range(74,160)
B Off = range(0, 74)
KD Ass= range(0,71)
B Ass = range(73,139)
D Ass = range(139, 162)
D KD Ass = range(139,154)
Officers = list(set().union(KD Off ,B Off))
KD Assignments = list(set().union(KD Ass ,D KD Ass))
Assignments = list(set().union(KD Ass , B Ass , D Ass))
#handlemods
#allowableChanges[0]: Assignment Restrictions
restrictions = rnd.sample(Officers, allowableChanges[0])
A r = {}
for restriction in restrictions:
A r[restriction] = rnd.sample(Assignments , int(rnd.
uniform(.05,.1) ∗ len(Assignments)))
#allowableChanges[1]: Directed Assignment
A d = {}
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availO = set(Officers)
availO −= set(restrictions)
directeds = rnd.sample(list(availO), allowableChanges[1])
availA = set(Assignments)
for directed in directeds:
availA −= set(A d.values())
A d[directed] = rnd.sample(list(availA), 1)
A d[directed]=A d[directed][0]
#allowableChanges[2]: Rejected Match
availO −= set(directeds)
rejects = []
while len(rejects) < allowableChanges[2]:
reject = rnd.sample(list(availO), 1)[0]
if int(lpA[reject]) != 999:
rejects.append(reject)
availO.remove(reject)
#Phase I, slot KD Offs/objective f 1
x={}
for o in KD Off:
for a in KD Assignments:
x[(o,a)] = kd m.addVar(vtype=gp.GRB.BINARY, obj = y[o],
name="O{0:03d}".format(o) + "A{0:03d}".format(a))
kd m.ModelSense = gp.GRB.MINIMIZE #MINIMIZE
for a in KD Assignments:
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kd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)]
for o in KD Off),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
for o in KD Off:
if o in list(restrictions):
if not list(set(A r[o])&set(KD Assignments)):
kd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in
list(set(A r[o])&set(KD Ass))), gp.GRB.EQUAL
,1)
kd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in
KD Assignments),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
else:
kd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in
KD Assignments),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,0)
elif o in list(directeds):
if A d[o] in list(KD Assignments):
kd m.addConstr(x[(o,A d[o])], gp.GRB.
EQUAL ,1)
kd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in
KD Assignments),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
else:
kd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in
KD Assignments),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,0)
elif o in list(rejects):
if int(lpA[o]) in list(KD Ass):
kd m.addConstr(x[(o,int(lpA[o]))], gp.GRB.EQUAL
,0)
kd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in
KD Assignments),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
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else:
kd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in
KD Assignments),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
else:
kd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in
KD Assignments),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
kd m.update()
kd m.setParam(’OutputFlag’, False)
#kd m.write(’lp.mps’)
kd m.optimize()
try:
y star = kd m.objVal
except:
return Solution(−1∗ np.ones(160), −1, −1)
#Continue with phase2, slot everyone− obj f 2
C = load obj(’C’)
x = {} #reallocating memory
bd m = gp.Model()
for o in Officers:
for a in Assignments:
x[(o,a)] = bd m.addVar(vtype=gp.GRB.BINARY, obj=C[(o,a)
],name="O{0:03d}".format(o) + "A{0:03d}".format(a))
bd m.ModelSense = gp.GRB.MINIMIZE #−1
for a in Assignments:
bd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)]
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for o in Officers),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
for o in Officers:
if o in list(restrictions):
bd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in A r[o]), gp
.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
bd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in Assignments
),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
elif o in list(directeds):
bd m.addConstr(x[(o,A d[o])], gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
bd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in Assignments
),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
elif o in list(rejects):
bd m.addConstr(x[(o,int(lpA[o]))], gp.GRB.EQUAL ,0)
bd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in Assignments
),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
else:
bd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(x[(o,a)] for a in Assignments
),gp.GRB.EQUAL ,1)
bd m.addConstr(gp.quicksum(gp.quicksum(y[o]∗x[(o,a)] for a in
KD Ass) for o in Officers), gp.GRB.LESS EQUAL , y star)
bd m.setParam(’OutputFlag’, False)
bd m.update()
bd m.optimize()
sol.finalSolution = np.zeros(160)
try:
for v in bd m.getVars():
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if v.x >0:
if int(v.varName[−3:])>=139 or int(v.varName
[−3:]) in [71,72]:
sol.finalSolution[int(v.varName[1:4])] = 999
else:
sol.finalSolution[int(v.varName[1:4])] = int
(v.varName[−3:])
sol.finalSolution = sol.finalSolution.astype(int
)
sol.resultStatusFlag = 0 #Good Execution
#save obj(sol.finalSolution , ’lpA’) #saved
locally first time and referenced later
sol.changes = sum(i != j for i, j in zip(sol.
finalSolution , lpA))
sol.obj = bd m.objVal
except:
sol = Solution(−1∗ np.ones(160), −1, −1)
else: #Error
print "Parameter Error: Invalid methodFlag"
sol = Solution(−1∗ np.ones(160), −1, −1)
if methodFlag == 1:
C = load obj(’C’)
sol.obj = 0
for i,j in enumerate(sol.finalSolution):
if j == 999:
pass
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else:
try:
sol.obj = sol.obj + C[(i,j)]
except KeyError: #infeasible solution
print (i,j)
sol.obj = −1
return sol
def eval(matching):
C = load obj(’C’)
eval = 0
for i,j in enumerate(matching):
if j == 999:
pass
else:
try:
eval = eval + C[(i,j)]
except KeyError: #infeasible solution
sol.obj = −1
return eval
def getRanks(matching):
KD Ass= range(0,71)
B Ass = range(73,139)
r kd = load obj(’r kd’)
r b = load obj(’r b’)
ranks = []
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for i,j in enumerate(matching):
if j == 999:
pass
else:
try:
if j in B Ass:
ranks.append(r b[i][j−73])
elif j in KD Ass:
ranks.append(r kd[i][j])
else:
pass
except KeyError:
ranks = [0]
if len(ranks) >0:
return ranks
else:
return [0]
def bestOfN(N,aC):
x={}
bestObj = float("inf")
bestPtr = 0
for i in range(0,N):
x[i] = SMA(aC)
#if x[i].obj <bestObj and x[i].obj>0: #FOR BESTOF OBJ
if x[i].changes <bestObj and x[i].changes>−1:
bestPtr = i
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bestObj = x[i].changes
return x[bestPtr]
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Appendix D. Storyboard
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